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Abstract
Due to increased complexity, scale, and functionality of in-
formation and telecommunication (IT) infrastructures, every
day new exploits and vulnerabilities are discovered. These
vulnerabilities are most of the time used by malicious peo-
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ple to penetrate these IT infrastructures for mainly disrupting
business or stealing intellectual properties. Current incidents
prove that it is not sufficient anymore to perform manual se-
curity tests of the IT infrastructure based on sporadic secu-
rity audits. Instead networks should be continuously tested
against possible attacks. In this paper we present current re-
sults and challenges towards realizing automated and scalable
solutions to identify possible attack scenarios in an IT infras-
tructure. Namely, we define an extensible framework which
uses public vulnerability databases to identify probable multi-
step attacks in an IT infrastructure, and provide recommen-
dations in the form of patching strategies, topology changes,
and configuration updates.
1 Introduction
Increased use of information and telecommunication infras-
tructures (IT) for monitoring and controlling critical infras-
tructures of modern societies mandates us to devote special
attention on their security. Due to increased complexity,
scale, and functionality, new vulnerabilities are discovered
almost every day. These vulnerabilities are exploited by ma-
licious people to penetrate the IT infrastructures for mainly
disrupting business or stealing intellectual properties. This
problem is intensified by modern attacks on the IT infras-
tructures, as represented by Stuxnet which combines several
mechanisms to exploit vulnerabilities in a range of operating
systems including industrial infrastructures [1], [2]. Stuxnet
employs several steps in order to infiltrate parts of the net-
worked infrastructure and in doing so gives way for new at-
tack scenarios that previously might have been considered un-
likely.
Cyber espionage and cyber warfare are considered to be
two of the most important threats for IT infrastructures. Cy-
ber espionage involves theft of intellectual properties and
knowledge of a company or an institute. Attackers make use
of vulnerabilities in an IT infrastructure to transfer large scale
datasets to another location within a short time window with-
out being detected [3]. Cyber warfare is another important
threat mostly targeting critical infrastructures of modern so-
cieties. Everyday more such systems get interconnected. This
trend changes the characteristics of military offences between
countries or terrorist activities as in the example of the denial
of service attack on Estonia [4].
The main challenge in analysis and identification of these
threats is the asynchronous nature of the problem. For an at-
tacker, it is sufficient to find a low cost attack scenario, while
the defender has to identify all probable attack scenarios. The
latter requires continuous analyses for vulnerabilities on all
network nodes for the whole application inventory. Network
security testing should not interrupt the daily business activi-
ties of an organization. Therefore it should be done in a vir-
tual environment with simulation and distributed computation
capabilities. Another drawback is the dimension of the prob-
lem which can be quite large due to a large number of vul-
nerabilities and exploits, firewall rules, address translations,
proxies, interdependencies, intrusion detection rules, and the
behavior of the clients. Even in a small scale networks with
tens of nodes, the problem can become quite unmanageable.
Additionally, standard vulnerability scanners are unable to
determine all possible multi-step attacks, as they only provide
analysis on a per node basis. Under these circumstances it is
quite challenging to come up with an attack scenario that can
test the security of the target network thoroughly. Moreover,
the concurrent patching of all related vulnerabilities may not
be feasible due to unavailability of patches, or due to applica-
tion dependencies and operational constraints.
Due to the complexity, scale, and dynamic nature of the
problem, it is not sufficient anymore to perform manual se-
curity analysis of an IT infrastructure based on sporadic se-
curity audits. Instead networks should be continuously tested
against possible multi-step attacks. Automated and scalable
security test solutions need to be developed so that secu-
rity administrators can be warned against possible penetra-
tion points along with the associated risk values in their in-
frastructures. In addition, they can be supported with rec-
ommendations to mitigate these threats. Recommendations,
such as patching strategies, topology changes, and configura-
tion updates, can be useful to reduce IT related risks in the
infrastructure.
There exist various activities [6], [7], [8] which address
subsets of these issues, but, up to our knowledge, there is
no unified open source solution. Existing solutions usually
address a specific problem, such as vulnerability scanning,
patch management, and IT security management. Moreover,
existing vulnerability assessment tools (such as nessus, saint,
openVAS, retine, GFI Languard) or GRCM (governance, risk
and compliance management) are only useful for manual
and sporadic security audits, and cannot analyze and identify
multi-step attacks in large scale IT infrastructures.
In this paper we outline an open source software frame-
work for automated security testing by using public vulnera-
bility and exploit databases. Our framework provides unified
testing opportunities with modules for information extraction,
attack analysis, risk management, security recommendation,
and security simulation. The framework is based on a multi-
agent system. Therefore it can scale and permits the integra-
tion of new functionalities and data sources. We envision that
the open source framework will be used by IT managers with-
out releasing valuable information to external parties. Secu-
rity audit companies usually scan an IT infrastructure once
with very limited knowledge due to privacy and on a per node
bases. Therefore they may not test the infrastructure thor-
oughly and may fail to cover all possible penetration points.
Our unified solution can be used by IT specialists within and
under control of the organization itself. It can provide a se-
cure distributed platform to collaboratively analyze interde-
pendent infrastructures belonging different administrative do-
mains. As the result, the security of the IT infrastructure will
be scored; identified weaknesses will be reported, and rec-
ommendations in terms of patching, configuration, and topol-
ogy changes will be generated. These recommendations will
be tested in the simulation component over up-to-date net-
work and services settings, and finally mitigation steps may
be taken to remove the important weaknesses.
Organization of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we
introduce our framework and describe its components. In
Sections 3 to 8, we review current research and development
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results to realize these components, and identify open prob-
lems to be addressed. Some final remarks in Section 9 con-
clude the paper.
2 Automated IT Security Testing
Framework and Its Components
We propose a scalable and extensible framework intercon-
nected with real network where attack analysis, risk analy-
sis, and testing of mitigation strategies can be performed con-
tinuously. Figure 1 depicts our framework, its components,
and their relations. Our automated security testing framework
contains six basic components.
Our view of IT security test consists of identifying possi-
ble attack paths reflecting probable multi-step attack vectors
within an IT infrastructure. This can be achieved with the
help of an ontological approach reflecting device vulnerabil-
ities, possible exploits, and the associated multi-step attacks.
The knowledge component includes ontologies tailored for
the vulnerability and threat domain. Knowledge reposito-
ries constructed using these ontologies can be populated by
using the information extracted and enriched from public
free-text vulnerability and threat databases as well as from
data sources of target IT infrastructures, such as software in-
ventory, topology, configuration, security policies, and fire-
wall rules. Vulnerability and threat databases contain large
number of unstructured free-text entries (NVD – National
Vulnerability Databases, OSVD – Open Source Vulnerabil-
ity Database, CVE – Common Vulnerabilities and Expo-
sures, CPE – Common Platform Enumeration, CWE – Com-
mon Weakness Enumeration, etc.)1 which usually need to
be processed manually by security experts. Automatic or
semi-automatic information extraction methods are required
for populating ontologies designed for vulnerabilities and ex-
ploits.
With our framework, we would like to associate exist-
ing vulnerabilities and exploits with the network elements,
servers, clients, applications, and services. Then, we will
identify multi-step attacks by using distributed analysis tech-
niques to decide IP, transport, or application level connec-
tivity through gateways with firewall, and proxy capabili-
ties. Scalability is one of the key points, since checking
45,000 vulnerabilities along with hundreds of firewall and
IDS rules for even small scale networks are infeasible with
existing approaches. The multi-step attack analysis compo-
nent includes distributed accessibility analysis, multi-step at-
tack analysis, and risk assessment functionalities. This com-
ponent associates vulnerability knowledge to IT infrastruc-
ture elements based on their properties and capabilities (op-
erating system, protocols, applications, services, patch lev-
els, etc.). Distributed accessibility analysis processes fire-
wall, proxy, access filter, address translation, and virtual pri-
vate network rules and policies to decide which compromised
node permits access to which other nodes. Multi-step attack
analysis uses accessibility information to enumerate attack
paths and reachable attack targets and sources. This infor-
mation together with IT infrastructure specific knowledge is
1nvd.nist.gov, osvdb.org, cve.mitre.org, cpe.mitre.org, cwe.mitre.org
Figure 1 Automated IT Security testing framework.
used in risk analysis to assess the risks to critical IT elements
and services.
The recommendation component generates best mitiga-
tion strategies under user specified constraints with respect
to the placement of firewall and intrusion detection devices,
patching plan, configuration change, software update, and
topology change.
Assessment of the risk and impact of attack vectors by IT
managers can be achieved by a novel simulation for secu-
rity and networking capabilities. Our open source simulation
framework (NeSSi2)2 [9] operating on JIAC3 [5] can handle
large-scale network topologies, services, and vulnerabilities.
The simulation component based on NeSSi2 helps assess the
impact of multi-step attacks and their mitigation strategies
over the target IT infrastructure and its services. It includes
methodologies for risk assessment, visualization, and what-if
analysis.
The use of distributed algorithms for attack analysis within
our open source multi-agent system JIAC ensures scalability.
The multi-agent system is built upon the JIAC framework
which provides scalability, and seamless service deployment
and modification. It also enables IT security test scenarios
which involve inter-dependent IT infrastructures which are
operated by different administrative domains.
In the following sections we review and compare existing
results, and identify open problems towards realizing these
components.
3 Vulnerability Databases
Publicly available vulnerability databases (such as NVD,
OSVD, CVE, CPE, CWE) are for human consumption, and
2Network Security Simulator (NeSSi2) – www.nessi2.de
3 Java-based Intelligent Agent Componentware (JIAC) – www.jiac.de
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they are unstructured. Thus, the available information is un-
suitable for direct machine interpretation, and it creates a
challenge for automatic security testing.
The Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language
(OVAL4) is a community standard which partially addresses
the non-machine readable nature of the current vulnerabil-
ity databases. It defines a machine readable language using
XML. One problem with OVAL is that the test results only in-
dicate the presence of a vulnerability, not its exploitability. To
successfully exploit a vulnerability a set of pre-conditions has
to be fulfilled in the attacked IT infrastructure. Examples of
these pre-conditions can be a particular software, the network
connectivity, and the attacker’s privilege level. After success-
ful exploitation of the vulnerability, the network is exposed
to a new set of conditions, called post-conditions, which can
help an attacker to launch new attacks against the system.
These post-conditions, as pointed out by Maggi et al. [10],
have a higher layer of abstraction than pre-conditions and can
be categorized as gained access (e.g. guest, user, root, etc.),
read, write, execute, corrupt, exhaust, create, delete, crash,
reboot, disrupt, and deny privileges. The partial pre- and
post-conditions of vulnerabilities are given as human read-
able text in the title or description sections of an OVAL def-
inition. We focus here on the mapping of this broad range
of post-conditions onto pre-conditions of other vulnerabilities
to model the chains of vulnerabilities and individual attacks
which may result in a multi-step attack.
4 Information Extraction
Information extraction (IE) deals with the automatic extrac-
tion of semantically meaningful units of information from
unstructured texts [29]. Two important subtasks of infor-
mation extraction systems are entity and attribute extraction
(e.g. software libraries, hardware products, services, version
number, and patch level in the security context), and relation
extraction, which is concerned with identifying relations be-
tween entities [28]. Storing and mapping extracted informa-
tion to a knowledge base needs to consider the consistency
and integrity of the collected information [30]. Challenges
arise also from the variability of natural language with respect
to the synonymy and ambiguity of words.
Information extraction methods can be applied to ex-
tract meaningful pre- and post-conditions from the free-
text descriptions available in vulnerability and threat
databases. A cursory analysis of these descriptions sug-
gests that they follow semi-regularized patterns (vulnerabil-
ity [X] in software [Y] allows [remote j local] attacker to
[gain j execute j : : : ] : : : ) which can be learned, e.g. by apply-
ing a Conditional Random Field approach [31]. In this way,
entities and their relations can be extracted and mapped onto
instances of pre- and post-conditions predefined in a knowl-
edge base. The application of word and entity disambiguation
methods [30], [32] will ensure that natural language variation
is adequately handled. It will also ensure that novel concepts
can be identified and used for ontology extension.
4oval.mitre.org
5 Attack Modeling and Analysis
A significant part of a network security testing comprise
defining the attack vectors which simply provide ordered lists
of vulnerabilities and associated individual attacks. Attack
modeling is an efficient way of representing the attack infor-
mation in a structured and reusable form. These structures
can be used in an automated solution to check security of an
IT infrastructure.
The attack tree is a formal concept introduced in [11] to
model the threats to a system in a structured tree representa-
tion given with an attacker’s goal. In an attack tree the root
node of the tree is the attacker’s overall goal and all the leaf
nodes below any parent node represent the ways the attacker
can use to accomplish the parent goal. The parent nodes may
have single or multiple leaf nodes. If the former is the case
then the achievement of the leaf node directly implies the
achievement of the parent node; if the latter is the case the
achievement of the parent node depends on the result of the
logical operation (i.e. AND/OR) bounded with the leaf nodes.
After having logically constructed the attack tree, each node
can be assigned a continuous or a Boolean value. Attack trees
with the assigned attributes can be converted to machine read-
able languages like XML and can be fed to several analysis
tools [12], [13], [14]. However, there is no standard way of
creating and storing these attack trees today. The creation of
the attack trees heavily depends on the domain knowledge of
the security experts.
A Petri net is a bipartite graph consisting of places, tran-
sitions, and arcs in which places represent a state of the mod-
eled system, transitions correspond to changes, and arcs de-
termine the direction of the changes. Each place contains a
set of tokens which moves among places when a transition
state fires [15], [17]. An attack net is a disjunctive Petri net
in which places represent the security states of a system and
transitions correspond to attacker’s actions to compromise the
system. The place of the tokens in the attack net shows the
compromised set of places by the attacker. The advantage
of using attack nets for attack modeling is the ability to con-
veniently represent the attack concurrency and progress with
the movement of tokens, attacker’s actions as transitions, and
the intermediate or final goals as places. Petri nets cannot
scale well and building a well formed definite logic program
with Petri nets has complexity of O.M 3N / where M is the
number of places and N is the number of transitions [16].
Model Checking is a validation method to check whether
a model M is consistent with the given property p or not.
The model checker performs an exhaustive search on the
model to find a counter-example which violates the given
property. Sheyner et al. [18] used model checking to gen-
erate attack graphs. In their approach the network is mod-
eled as a finite state machine and each transition corresponds
to an attacker’s action. The security policy of the system is
defined as a property and the violation of the defined policy
implies the existence of an attack path. The model checker
tool NuSMV5 which stores each transition and state as a bi-
nary expression using Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) is
utilized to compute the attack graph. The severe drawback
5 http://nusmv.fbk.eu/
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of the model checking approach is the state explosion prob-
lem which makes it infeasible to use for large size enterprise
networks. Host-centric model checking is introduced to over-
come the state explosion problem [19]. By using the assump-
tion that an attacker will never relinquish a state, attack graph
generation is achieved in quadratic polynomial time.
MIT-Lincoln-Lab showed in [20], [21] that the full at-
tack graph does not scale well. The number of the states in a
full attack graph grows up to O.N !/. They have suggested
two attack graphs namely Predictive Graph and Multiple-
Prerequisite graph. The main idea behind these two attack
graphs is to eliminate the redundant nodes. The assumption
is that the attacker will exploit the vulnerability as long as
it reaches to the vulnerable machine. The only two precon-
ditions of a vulnerability considered in their approach is the
locality (remote or local) of the attacker and the connectiv-
ity. The post-condition of vulnerability is categorized by four
access levels: user, administrative, DOS, and other.
In the predictive graph a child node adds a vulnerabil-
ity to the graph only if none of its ancestors already used the
vulnerability to reach the state before. The predictive graph
scales with O.N 2 log N / in a network with no filtering de-
vices (e.g. firewall, router) and N hosts.
The multiple-prerequisite (MP) graph introduces three
different node types which represent the attacker’s access
level, pre-conditions, and the vulnerabilities. The arcs have
no content; they are simply associations between nodes. The
three different arcs must point either from a state node to a
condition, from a condition to a vulnerability instance, and
from a vulnerability instance to a state node. Ingols et al. in
[20], [21] suggested the use of reachability groups instead of
a reachability matrix. There is no need to compute the reacha-
bility of the nodes in the same subnet, since there are no filter-
ing devices between them. Therefore the reachability matrix
for a single subnet can be collapsed into a single group. A
reachability group dramatically reduces the time and mem-
ory needed to construct reachability information. The result-
ing multi-prerequisite graph is also further simplified. The
state nodes whose pre- and post- requisites are identical are
collapsed into a single state group. Then the vulnerability in-
stances, which have identical pre-requisites, and the collapsed
states forms a single vulnerability group. Given N nodes and
E edges, the complexity of proposed graph simplification al-
gorithm becomes O.E C N log N /.
Client side vulnerabilities can be addressed by back-
wards reachability analysis. The assumption is that if there
is a reverse path from the client side to the attack source then
the client side vulnerability will be exploited. The modeling
of host firewalls imposes a heavy burden on the reachability
computation. This can be resolved by grouping the host fire-
walls which have similar rule sets.
Logic-based attack modeling reveals the causal relation-
ship between attack steps. Ou et al.’s approach for a scalable
attack generation is inspired by an early model checking of
the attack graph [25]. The entire network state is represented
as a Boolean expression in each node. Each network config-
uration and attacker’s privileges are represented as a proposi-
tional formula. The technique is goal-oriented, i.e., the user
has to specify a goal (e.g., execCode.attacker,workStation,
root/) for the reasoning engine to generate the attack graph
realizing the specified goal. Given a network with N ma-
chines the complexity of logic based attack graph is between
O.N 2/ and O.N 3/.
6 Risk Management ans Security
Recommendations
Ingols et al. [20], [21] suggest a pretty straightforward rec-
ommendation algorithm in which they try to identify the vul-
nerabilities which lead to the largest number of host compro-
mises. They identify their weighting metrics as the ratio of
the non-compromised hosts over all compromised hosts after
deployment of a patch. The attack graph is generated from
scratch each time a recommendation is tested. In addition,
their recommendation algorithms do not take into account
the organizational requirements, such as dependency between
the services or the economical values of these services. They
consider a worst case exploitation assumption and do not con-
sider the CVSS6 impact values or exploitability metrics, such
as the likelihood or complexity of an attack.
Mehta et al. [26] use two different algorithms to rank and
measure the probability of the existence of an attacker in each
state over the attack graph. They adopt Google’s PageRank
algorithm and apply it with some minor changes. Sawilla
et al. [27] applied Google’s PageRank algorithm to identify
most realistic and easiest attack vectors. The authors used
a variety of weighting metrics to measure the criticality of
attacks by considering the likelihood and complexity of an
attack, the availability of an exploit, and the relative signifi-
cance of a network asset. The former two metrics are taken
from publicly available CVSS database, but the latter varies
from one organization to another and the network administra-
tors have to assign asset values.
The objective of the recommendation algorithms is to
combat with the identified attack scenarios in the most cost–
effective manner. For this purpose, complex dependencies
between assets and processes in an IT infrastructure should
be taken into consideration. We adapt a business process-
oriented approach where risk assessment, vulnerability as-
sessment, and risk mitigation are integrated into a quantitative
framework [22]. By using the asset dependencies, business
process values can be mapped onto IT hardware components
in a hierarchical manner. These mappings should also con-
sider the problem of uncertainty which means that there will
never be perfect knowledge about the IT infrastructure, since
neither inventory systems nor tools can reliably provide the
current state. These mappings can be combined with the IT
system vulnerability and attack analysis to derive risk scores
on a network node level.
7 Security Simulation
Existing tools that support security evaluation with simula-
tion are rare and usually focused on specific problems. Wei
et al. [23] focus on epidemiological models of worm prop-
6http://www.first.org/cvss/
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agation and developed for this a distributed simulation tool.
Another example is Liljenstam et al. [24], they describe in
their work the simulation tool RINSE. The focus of their tool
is to create distributed simulation environment that is capable
to interact with human during a simulation and allow them
to issue commands. The intended use of the tool is security
related education and security related exercises, like LÜKEX
2011. During this nation-wide crisis management exercise
governmental organizations will test how well they are pre-
pared against large-scale cyber-attacks against national IT in-
frastructures. Exercises like LÜKEX7 2011 are time consum-
ing and costly. In the end they only reflect the state on certain
point in time.
In our approach a data gathering agent exists that creates
a model of the IT infrastructure to be tested. This agent com-
bines several components for the actual data gathering. These
components include: network scanners, database connectors,
and correlation components. Network scanners actively try to
collect information about the network topology, e.g. by wrap-
ping nmap8:Database connectors can connect to an inventory
system of a company and retrieve the stored information. Fi-
nally the correlation component combines output and creates
the topology. This can then be modified by a system admin-
istrator to resolve conflicts or to add missing components.
Based on the information about the network topology, the
applications on network nodes, and the data available from
vulnerability database, it is possible to construct a description
of possible attack vectors on assets of the target organization.
This is similar to work described by Foo et al. [7]. In con-
trast, it is not used for intrusion response purposes in running
systems, but for calculating risks for the organization, plan-
ning and performing security tests, and evaluating different
protection approaches, either preventive or responsive.
8 Multi-Agent Systems
Our approach is based on a multi-agent system. The main
reason for this is the distributed nature of the problem and the
requirement of continuous autonomous operation. Basically,
our system will consist of multiple agents for the steps in an
autonomous control loop (see, for example, Huebscher and
McCann [33]). These agents all have their specific tasks and
goals and contribute to the overall goal of continuous secu-
rity testing and reporting. One main concern in developing
the multi-agent system are the security requirements of the
system itself, since it requires sharing of sensitive data be-
tween agents running in a distributed environment which may
be controlled by different organization units. In this context
sensitive data are any data that fall in the area of regulated by
privacy laws, organizational confidentiality, and secrecy re-
quirements. This can be addressed by two approaches. First,
by using distributed algorithms that do not require sensitive
data, e.g. during the risk analysis only values of assets need
to be communicated but no information that could be used to
identify assets. Alternatively, data collection agents prepro-
cess data before sharing. This preprocessing makes the data
7 LÜKEX 2011 http://www.denis.bund.de/luekex/
8 http://nmap.org/
anonymous or pseudonymous. Anonymization guarantees a
higher degree of privacy and secrecy, but pseudomization is
more useful in case of incident handling, since authorized
stuff can recover the original values.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we presented an open source software frame-
work for automated identification of possible attack scenar-
ios in IT infrastructures by using public vulnerability and ex-
ploit databases. We are planning to exploit our current re-
sults in the multi-agent system (JIAC), for security simula-
tion (NeSSi2/, risk management, attack analysis, and intru-
sion response. Based on our literature review, further activ-
ities are required in research points: (i) automatic and semi-
automatic information extraction methods, (ii) distributed ap-
proaches for attack analysis for complex and large scale IT
infrastructures, (iii) quantitative risk analysis, (iv) recommen-
dations based on assets and processes in IT infrastructure, (v)
security simulation for analysis of different mitigation sce-
narios, and (vi) usability, scalability and extensibility of the
framework.
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